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INTRODUCTION

It may be bordering on apostasy in certain circles to suggest that

Knick v. Township of Scott1 — in which a sharply divided Supreme

Court held that municipal and local governments may be sued in

*

Robert H. Thomas is the Joseph T. Waldo Visiting Chair in Property Rights Law at
William & Mary Law School, and practices with Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
in Honolulu, Hawaii. He writes about takings and property law at
inversecondemnation.com.
1. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).

509

510

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

federal court to recover just compensation for Fifth Amendment
regulatory takings2 — is a ruling that municipalities could celebrate.
After all, how could a decision that overruled a case that for more than
three decades had effectively shut federal takings claimants out of
federal court by relegating them to (presumably) more local
government-friendly state courts be a good thing for local
governments?
The Knick majority concluded that a federal regulatory takings
claim is ripe for federal court review from the moment a municipality
adopts an allegedly confiscatory regulation without providing
compensation, even if a state court would also entertain a state law
takings or inverse condemnation claim.3 The reason why local
governments should look for a silver lining in the majority ruling is the
unstated premise which all the justices confronted: Are local
governments merely conveniences of the state, or are they separate
from the state and its judiciary? This Article suggests that the answer
to that question is the latter — state courts resolving state law inverse
condemnation and state takings claims are not part of a local
government’s taking and compensation mechanism.
First, Part I of this Article summarizes the nature of a regulatory
takings claim and explains the rationale which the Supreme Court
crafted in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City to conclude that federal regulatory
takings claims were not ripe for federal court review until a state court
rejected a property owner’s pursuit of compensation through state
Part I also describes how the state procedures
procedures.4
requirement and preclusion rules were employed to catch property
owners in a trap in which their federal takings claims were deemed to
be either too early or too late. Second, Part II analyzes the Knick
decision and the majority and dissent’s rationales, and focuses on the
critical — but unstated — rationale at the center of the Court’s debate.
Finally, the Article concludes by arguing that reopening the federal
courthouse doors to federal takings claims without the need to first
pursue state remedies is supported by a strong view of municipal home
rule and autonomy.

2. Id. at 2168 (property owner “may bring his claim in federal court under [42
U.S.C.] § 1983 at that time”).
3. Id. at 2167 (“We now concluded that the state-litigation requirement imposes
an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our takings
jurisprudence, and must be overruled.”).
4. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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I. TAKINGS, EXHAUSTION, PRECLUSION, AND REMOVAL

This Part of the Article summarizes the nature of a federal takings
claim, how the Court in Williamson County adopted the state
procedures requirement with little briefing (and none of the usual
percolation of issues), and how two subsequent decisions magnified
Williamson County’s inherent unfairness.
A. Mahon: An Old Idea Renewed

This section briefly explains the nature of a regulatory takings claim
and the rationale the Court created in Williamson County to justify the
state procedures requirement, purportedly based on the text of the
Fifth Amendment, but in reality, manufactured from whole cloth by
the Court.
A federal regulatory takings claim5 is the idea, first articulated in the
modern era in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,6 that if a regulation
goes “too far” in restricting the owner’s use of property, it is the
functional equivalent of an exercise of eminent domain and will be
recognized as a taking, for which the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate the payment of compensation. While Mahon is
often cited as the first takings case,7 the idea that an exercise of
governmental power other than the eminent domain power could
trigger an obligation to provide an affected property owner
compensation was a long-standing principle of the common law.8 In
short, if a local government’s regulation restricts an owner’s use
severely, it is, from the owner’s viewpoint, no different than a seizure
of property by eminent domain.9 Since 1897, state and local
governments have been — by virtue of incorporation of the Fifth

5. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
6. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least is that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”).
7. See, e.g., David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in
Land Use Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 43–44 (2014).
8. See, e.g., Gardner v. Village of Newbergh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)
(Kent, J.) (municipality required to compensate riparian property owner before it
rerouted the stream away from the owner’s land by ordinance); see also In re The
King’s Prerogative in Saltpeter, 12 Coke R. 13, 14 (1606) (The King’s agents may take
saltpeter, but “[t]hey ought to make the Places, in which they dig, so well and
commodious to the Owner as they were before.”).
9. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 529 (2005) (the takings inquiry
is designed “to identify those regulations whose effects are functionally comparable to
government appropriation or invasion of private property”).
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Amendment under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
— subject to the just compensation imperative.10 For more than 60
years after Mahon, there was not a serious question that a federal claim
for compensation could be asserted against local governments by
property owners in federal court. As a result, federal courts routinely
resolved these cases.
B. Williamson County: The Supreme Court Makes Up the State
Procedures Requirement

In 1985, in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,11 the Court — mostly out of nowhere,

as neither the court below nor the parties had argued for it — adopted
two procedural prerequisites owners had to show before a federal
takings claim was considered ripe for federal court. First, the
regulating agency had to make the final decision on what uses are
allowed under the regulation.12 If the agency’s process is ongoing,
there is no way for a reviewing court to tell what uses of the property
remain. This is known as the “final decision” requirement.13 Second,

10. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–
34 (1897).
11. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
12. Id. at 186 (“As the court has made clear in several recent decisions, a claim that
the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not
ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has
reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at
issue.”).
13. The “final decision” referenced by the Court not only includes a decision by the
local government applying the regulation to the property, but also what the Court
called a “variance.” Id. at 187–88 (“But, like the Hodel plaintiffs, respondent did not
then seek variances that would have allowed it to develop the property according to its
proposed plat, notwithstanding the Commission’s finding that the plat did not comply
with the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations.”). As anyone familiar with land
use law will say, however, a variance is not simply a request for reconsideration, but is
only available in limited circumstances where the denial of an application will result in
severe and “unnecessary” hardship on the applicant. See, e.g., Otto v. Steinhilber, 24
N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1939); Surfrider Found. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 358 P.3d 664,
676 (Haw. 2015). A variance permits a local zoning authority to allow a requested use
or design that is otherwise prohibited and has been described as a “safety valve” to
relieve hardship on a property owner that might be caused by strict application of
zoning restrictions. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Cohen, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The
Variance in Zoning and Land-Use Based Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 307, 308 (1995). A general rule, after all, cannot account for all
circumstances, and there may be instances where applying the rule to a particular
parcel would create unfair hardship. See, e.g., Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple
of Haw. v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1319 (Haw. 1998) (owner argued that strict
application of building height limit worked as a hardship). Variances are also safety
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the owner must not only have been denied compensation by the local
government, but she must also have sued the local government in state
court for inverse condemnation to try and force it to pay compensation
for the regulatory taking under state law.14
In what became known as the “state-litigation” or “state
procedures” requirement, the Williamson County Court reasoned that
the Fifth Amendment only makes a taking of property “without just
compensation” unconstitutional.15 The majority based its conclusion
on the text of the Just Compensation Clause: “[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”16 The
Court also referenced a touchstone of eminent domain law, that “the
Fifth Amendment [does not] require that just compensation be paid in
advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking: all that is required
is that a ‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation’ exist at the time of the taking.”17 This principle, which
allows the federal government to “take now, pay later,” would become
a key point of debate between the Knick majority and dissenters.18 The
Williamson County Court ultimately held that Tennessee courts would
entertain an inverse condemnation lawsuit under a state statute, and,
conflating local governments with “the State,” held that a state-law
inverse condemnation lawsuit, prosecuted in state court, was a
reasonable, certain, and adequate process to secure compensation.19
The owner must both pursue a lawsuit — and lose it — before the
federal takings claims ripened.20 The Court reasoned that because the

valves for the government since they are a takings avoidance mechanism, which allows
development in lieu of a takings judgment when denial of permission to build would
be a taking. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 297 (1981) (takings claim not ripe until owner has sought variance).
14. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 (“A second reason the taking claim is not yet
ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State
has provided for doing so.”).
15. See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 297 n.40 (1981).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 124–25 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641,
659 (1890))).
18. Compare Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2019) (“The Fifth
Amendment right to full compensation arises at the time of the taking, regardless of
post-taking remedies that may be available to the property owner.”), with id. at 2181
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority today holds, in conflict with precedent after
precedent, that a government violates the Constitution whenever it takes property
without advance compensation — no matter how good its commitment to pay.”).
19. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 196.
20. Id. (“The Tennessee state courts have interpreted § 29-16-123 to allow recovery
through inverse condemnation where the ‘taking’ is effected by restrictive zoning laws
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local government had not yet actually “denied” compensation until it
lost the owner’s state court lawsuit to recover compensation, the
constitutional wrong had not occurred until the state supreme court
ruled in the government’s favor that no compensation was owed.21
Only then was a taking “without just compensation,” and a federal
takings claim substantively ripe for federal court consideration.22
To characterize this rationale as facile and recursive would be an
understatement. In nearly every circumstance, the local government
had, almost by definition, already “denied” owing compensation,
either by not affirmatively providing for compensation in the allegedly
offending regulation itself or by disclaiming Fifth Amendment liability
in response to an owner’s pre-lawsuit demand. The government’s
position in nearly every regulatory takings case, after all, is that it is
merely regulating property under its police or other regulatory power
— not taking it by eminent domain. Thus, it should have surprised no
one that these regulations rarely if ever acknowledged the obligation
to provide compensation.
This convoluted logic resulted in
commentators beginning to take apart Williamson County’s rationale
and its stretching of the constitutional text almost immediately after
the Court issued the opinion.23
The Court’s analysis in Williamson County was easily subject to
attack because the Court based its holding on ripeness even though
none of the parties raised or briefed it. The parties disputed whether a
restriction on the use of property that is eventually lifted could be a
temporary taking requiring compensation (an issue later resolved by
the Court positively in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles County).24 The U.S. Solicitor General, however, as
amicus curiae argued that federal courts could not even hear a federal
claim for compensation (permanent, temporary, or otherwise) until the

or development regulations.” (citing Davis v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 620 S.W.2d
532, 533–34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Speight v. Lockhart, 524 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1975))).
21. Id. at 186.
22. Id.
23. The figurative ink was not dry on the opinion when commentators began
immediately blasting the Court’s rationale. The first in a long line of scholarly attacks
on the case was Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 39, 39–40 (1985) (“[Williamson County] takes its place in the pantheon
of indecision . . . as demonstrating that those learned in the ways of the law can always
find a way to duck an issue. With all due respect, the . . . non-decision is both bad law
and bad government.”).
24. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304, 312 (1987) (compensation is an available remedy for a temporary taking, and an
owner is not limited to seeking invalidation of the regulation).
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owner either lost a state law inverse claim in her state’s highest court
or could show that the remedy was not available under state law.25 The
Court latched on to that argument and adopted it as a virtual wall
around the federal courts for federal takings claims.
The Court ventured into unchartered waters when it relied on two
Tennessee Court of Appeals decisions to support the conclusion that a
property owner could seek — and presumably in the right
circumstances recover — just compensation for a regulatory taking in
an inverse condemnation lawsuit.26 The problem was that the only
Tennessee court that mattered — the Tennessee Supreme Court —
had actually not interpreted the statute that way and would not do so
for another three decades. Indeed, at the time of Williamson County,
the Tennessee Supreme Court expressly limited recovery of
compensation under the statute to physical occupation and “nuisancetype” takings, as it later recognized:
It is true that until today this Court has recognized only physical
occupation takings and nuisance-type takings . . . . We hold that, like
the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, article I, section
21 of the Tennessee Constitution encompasses regulatory takings and
that the Property Owners’ complaint is sufficient to allege a state
constitutional regulatory taking claim, for which they may seek
compensation under Tennessee’s inverse condemnation statute,
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-16-123.27

In short, the Williamson County Court was flatly wrong when it
concluded the property owner could pursue a compensation remedy in
a Tennessee court for a regulatory taking under state law, and
therefore was required to do so.

25. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. 172 (No. 84-4) (“The viability of respondent’s taking claim

in federal court is further undermined by respondent’s failure to seek judicial review
in state court of the Commission’s disapproval of its preliminary plat in June 1981. If,
as it appears, there was an available state procedure for obtaining such review, then
the Commission’s decision did not under state law constitute a final rejection by the
State of respondent’s claim of a right to develop its property in conformity with its
submission.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162,
2174 (2019) (“As amicus curiae in support of the local government, the United States
argued in this Court that the developer could not state a Fifth Amendment claim
because it had not pursued an inverse condemnation suit in state court. Neither party
had raised that argument before.” (footnote omitted)).
26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
27. Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 243–45 (Tenn. 2014); see also
id. at 242 (issue of whether compensation under the inverse condemnation statute was
available for regulatory takings claims was “an issue of first impression for this Court”).
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But despite its faulty foundation, Williamson County was the law,
and local governments had a very potent tool in its quiver. Legal
scholars who supported the Williamson County state-procedures rule
(or, more accurately, the limitations it placed on property owners’
rights) began searching for rationales to justify it (for example, through
comity, federalism,28 and even textualism).29 Nevertheless, for the next
three decades, the deconstruction of the case and its rationale by the
property bar and much of the legal academy continued unabated.30
C. The San Remo Preclusion Trap

The questionable rationale of Williamson County was dramatically
laid bare in San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco,31
where the Court took Williamson County’s flawed logic to its
inevitable end. There, the Court endorsed a “you’re either too early,
or you’re too late” theory. In essence, the very process by which an
owner ripened a federal takings claim — chasing and eventually losing
a state law inverse condemnation lawsuit in state court — also meant
that when the owner later asserted a ripened federal takings claim in
federal court, that claim would be deemed precluded by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.32 Federal courts owe state judgments the same
respect they would be given in state court, and that includes the effects
of the state’s law of claim and issue preclusion.33 Resolving the state
inverse claim as Williamson County required meant that a property
owner had also thereby litigated her future unripe federal takings claim
(even where she expressly tried not to do so).34 And, because a state
court would consider a subsequent federal takings claim precluded by
litigation of a state inverse condemnation claim, so must the federal
court as a matter of full faith and credit.35
28. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 205 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Katherine Mims Crocker, Justifying a Prudential Solution to the
Williamson County Ripeness Puzzle, 49 GA. L. REV. 163, 176–77 (2014).
30. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM.

& MARY L. REV. 251, 284–300 (2006).
31. 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
32. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and the Full Faith
and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012), require that federal courts give judgments
of state courts the same effect they would have in state court.
33. See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345–46.
34. Nor could an England reservation avoid the preclusion trap. See England v. La.
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 428 (1964) (in state courts, a plaintiff may
expressly “reserve” federal issues, and doing so avoids a later claim that the federal
issue was litigated in state court).
35. See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345.
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The short story was that if a property owner filed a federal takings
claim in federal court without first having lost in state court, the owner
was deemed to be too early under Williamson County’s state
procedures requirement. But if the owner followed Williamson
County’s rule and went through the state law process and lost the claim
for compensation, the owner would be barred by preclusion principles
from “relitigating” in federal court his federal takings claim, even
though he had never actually litigated that issue.
The Catch-22 nature of this prompted four justices to note in San
Remo that the Williamson County rationale was due for a second look.
(A first look, actually, since the question was never actually litigated
by the parties in Williamson County.) Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Finally, Williamson County’s state-litigation rule has created some
real anomalies, justifying our revisiting the issue . . . . I joined the
opinion of the Court in Williamson County. But further reflection
and experience lead me to think that the justifications for its statelitigation requirement are suspect, while its impact on takings
plaintiffs is dramatic . . . . In an appropriate case, I believe the Court
should reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment
takings claim based on the final decision of a state or local
government entity must first seek compensation in state courts.36

The four concurring justices in San Remo were not interested in
revisiting Williamson County, however, because the property owners
had not asked them to (although that did not stop the Court in
Williamson County from adopting a rule sue sponte, so it is unclear
what spurred the hesitation in San Remo).37
D. International College: The State Procedures Requirement Hits
Rock Bottom

In 1997, the Supreme Court completed the ripeness anomaly hat
trick. In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, the
Court did not bat an eye when a local government defendant removed
the plaintiff’s federal takings claim from state to federal court under

36. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 351–52 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
37. An exchange in the San Remo oral arguments with Justice O’Connor went like
this:
JUSTICE O’CONNOR: And you haven’t asked us to revisit that Williamson
County case, have you?
MR. UTRECHT: We have not asked that this Court reconsider the decision
in Williamson County.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR: Maybe you should have.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. 323 (No. 04-340).

518

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

federal question “arising under” jurisdiction. 38 The plaintiff raised a
state law claim in state court (as Williamson County required it do).39
How could the municipality remove a case where under the “state
litigation” requirement, the federal constitutional issue was not ripe
because the state litigation had not resulted in a denial of
compensation? The answer to this question is not clear, as the Court
provided no answer.
This resulted in the asymmetry where a federal regulatory takings
plaintiff could not bring a case in federal court, but a local government
(or state defendant if it was willing to waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity) could remove the state court lawsuit to federal court

because the federal claim originally could have been brought there
(even though technically under Williamson County, it could not). In a

few of the more extreme examples of this anomaly, some courts did not
blink when the local government defendant — which had removed the
case to federal court — then sought dismissal of the takings claim on
the grounds that the federal takings claims were not ripe because the
state courts had not yet rejected the owner’s claim for compensation.
The reason why the state courts had not denied the plaintiff’s state law
claim for compensation was because the defendant had removed the
case to federal court. Several courts rejected this sleight-of-hand, in
some cases even sanctioning the government for having spoken out of
both sides of its mouth.40
But many courts paid no mind at all. Warner v. City of Marathon41
exemplifies these latter cases. There, Florida property owners raised a
regulatory takings claim in Florida state court42 — a prudent move,
given Williamson County. The city removed the case as a federal
question, exercising its International College power.43 The district
court dismissed the case as unripe under Williamson County’s state
procedures requirement, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Wait a
minute, the property owner argued, we did what the Supreme Court in

38. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
39. Id. at 160.
40. See, e.g., Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1110 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (city removed case to federal court, and on the eve of trial sought a remand
under Williamson County; the court rejected the argument, concluding, “the City
having invoked federal jurisdiction, its effort to multiply these proceedings by a
remand to state court smacks of bad faith”); see also Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752
F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2014); Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 544–47 (4th
Cir. 2013); Key Outdoor Inc. v. City of Galesburg, 327 F.3d 549, 550 (7th Cir. 2003).
41. Warner v. City of Marathon, 718 Fed. App’x. 834 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
42. Id. at 836.
43. See id.
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Williamson County told us we had to do: We brought our state law

takings claim in a Florida court, asking for compensation through
available procedures, so we’re not here in federal court willingly. We
were in the process of ripening our federal claim in state court when
the city removed us to federal court. But the Eleventh Circuit rejected
that argument, concluding the case was not ripe because the property
owners had not secured a denial of their compensation claim by the
state court:
The plaintiffs also did not allege in their complaint that they availed
themselves of this remedy and were denied relief. Instead, the
plaintiffs seem to assert on appeal that the takings claim presented in
their complaint is their just compensation claim. Notwithstanding the
possibility that they were attempting to assert an inverse
condemnation claim in Florida state court before the case was
removed to federal court, we cannot review the claim until the
plaintiffs have been denied relief by a Florida court.44

Just how were the plaintiffs in Warner supposed to have sought and
be denied compensation in state court when the city removed the case
midstream, before they could pursue and obtain a ruling there?
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
takings claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (without prejudice),
which effectively served as a remand order of the city’s removal.45
Thus, the case returned to state court. Although the property owner
lost time (and attorneys’ fees), it at least did not suffer the indignity of
a dismissal with prejudice. Even so, the case highlights the foolishness
that Williamson County’s state procedures requirement spawned: If
the plaintiffs went back to state court (where they were originally) and
filed a new suit against the city, what would prevent the city from
removing it yet again? While extreme, this case is just one example of
the very real problems that Williamson County enabled.46

44. Id. at 838.
45. Id.
46. See also, e.g., Koscielski v. City of Minneapolis, 435 F.3d 898, 903–04 (8th Cir.
2006); Sandy Creek Inv’rs, Ltd. v. City of Jonestown, 325 F.3d 623, 626 (5th Cir. 2003)
(dismissing the case on appeal because the district court did not have jurisdiction to
resolve takings claims that were removed from state court); Ohad Assocs., LLC v.
Township of Marlboro, No. CV 10-2183 (AET), 2011 WL 310708, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan.
28, 2011); 8679 Trout, LLC v. N. Tahoe Pub. Utils. Dist., No. 2:10-cv-01569-MCE-EFB,
2010 WL 3521952, at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010); Del-Prairie Stock Farm, Inc. v.
County of Walworth, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2008); Rau v. City of
Garden Plain, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1174–75 (D. Kan. 1999) (recognizing the incoherent
application of the Williamson County state litigation requirement and remanding a
removed case to state court rather than dismiss the takings claims).
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E. Takings Litigation Devolves into Dickensian Dystopia

To a lawyer or legal scholar’s eyes, Williamson County’s state
procedures requirement might charitably be called opaque. But when
coupled with the you’re-either-too-early-or-you’re-too-late trap
endorsed by San Remo and the unilateral removal power of
International College, to property owners who needlessly must have
budgeted years of legal fees if they wanted to even think about ripening
a federal constitutional takings claim for federal court, it became
maddeningly dense. It erected a nearly impossible-to-overcome hurdle
for anyone who desired to vindicate their federal constitutional
property rights in a federal forum.47
In theory, of course, a property owner who possessed the dual
luxuries of time and a thick wallet could do what the Court
contemplated: after the local government’s position was fixed, the
owner could ask the government for compensation, be denied, and
then sue the government in state court to force the government to
recognize its obligation to pay compensation under state law.48 When,
presumably, years later, the owner eventually lost that claim — thus
ripening the federal takings claim because the local government had
finally taken the property “without just compensation” — the owner
could then bring a complaint in federal court.49
However, as a practical and procedural matter, owners never got
anywhere close to successfully running Williamson County’s gauntlet,
and the substantive ripeness of the “state procedures” rationale
amounted to a requirement for a property owner to exhaust state
remedies. No other federal civil rights plaintiff alleging a violation of
her federal constitutional rights by local governments had to adhere to
this requirement. Thus, even a monkey — a monkey! — had the keys
to the federal courthouse door to assert its property rights in a
“selfie.”50 Federal courts regularly entertained cases about whether —
contrary to Chris Rock’s dictum — something untoward really might

47. See Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in
Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 103 (2000) (“Ripeness rules are used

as an offensive weapon to delay litigation, increase both fiscal and emotional costs to
the property owner, and convince potential plaintiffs that they should not even try to
‘fight city hall.’” (internal citations omitted)).
48. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985).
49. See id. at 194.
50. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 424, 426 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding Naruto, a
crested macaque, has Article III standing, but no standing under the Copyright Act).

2020] SUBLIMATING MUNICIPAL HOME RULE

521

be going on in the Champagne Room.51 A local law interfered with a
desire to create Valentine’s Day artwork out of the plaintiffs’ nude
bodies? Go straight to federal court, no questions asked.52 City animal
control officers took a homeless man’s 18 diseased pigeons, pet crow,
and seagull? Go straight to federal court, too — just be sure to couch
the claim as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth.53 But
if a state or local government infringed on a Fifth Amendment
property right? Go to state court and stay there. For more than 30
years, as a consequence of Williamson County’s state procedures
requirement and San Remo’s preclusion trap, federal courts simply did
not deign to “do” takings, unless the local government decided to
remove it from state to federal court under International College.54
As a result, for 30-plus years, property owners, their lawyers, legal
scholars, and the courts struggled. State court judges got a real
education in federal takings law, but the only hope of having a federal
court consider a federal takings claim was the thin reed of the Supreme
Court exercising certiorari to review a state supreme court’s judgment.
However, that is a notoriously thin reed. Of course, there were some
efforts to limit the bite of the ripeness doctrine. For example, sensing
the injustice of singling-out federal property claims for exclusion from
federal courts, some lower courts treated Williamson County’s stateprocedures ripeness rule as not jurisdictional, but merely a
“prudential” requirement; a rule a federal court could overlook if it
wanted to hear the case.55 Case-by-case federal jurisdiction is not
exactly the best circumstance to promote certainty, regularity, and
predictability, though. However, a huge percentage of property
owners who were not willing to pay their lawyers to contribute
materials for Federal Courts treatises or otherwise endure years of
pointless procedural wrangling declined to pursue their rights or ended
up throwing in the towel midstream.
The Sixth Circuit summed up well the odyssey on which property
owners were required to embark:
[I]t is obvious to us that, left to the devices of the Village’s counsel,
this case will become another Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, with the

51. See, e.g., Flanigan’s Enters. v. Fulton County, 596 F.3d 1265, 1268–69 (11th Cir.
2010) (challenging ordinance prohibiting alcohol sales at nude dancing
establishments).
52. See, e.g., Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007).
53. See Recchia v. City of L.A. Dep’t of Animal Servs., 889 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2018).
54. See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 157 (1997).
55. See, e.g., Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 390 (2019).

522

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

participants “mistily engaged in one of the ten thousand stages of an
endless cause, tripping one another up on slippery precedents,
groping knee-deep in technicalities, running their . . . heads against
walls of words, and making a pretense of equity . . . .” For nearly ten
years, the Kruses have endeavored to vindicate their property rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and by state statutes. The Village’s
actions threaten to turn the Kruse family into generations of “ruined
suitors” pursuing legal redress in a system “which gives to monied
might, the means abundantly of wearying out the right; which so
exhausts finances, patience, courage, hope” as to leave them
“perennially hopeless.” Enough is enough, and then some.56

Williamson County’s state procedures exhaustion requirement
certainly could not have been intended to be simply a tool to financially
bleed out property owners by running them through a time-consuming
and ultimately pointless maze — a “procedural monster.”57
One additional dynamic contributed to the chaos. As noted above,
the Supreme Court adopted the state-litigation rule without the benefit
of party briefing or argument, and without a developed body of
scholarly work as a foundation.58 In doing so, it reversed the usual
process of getting an issue up to the Supreme Court. Generally, issues
contentious enough to merit high court review are most often allowed
— even required — to “percolate” for years in the lower courts and law
journals, before the Court is ready to take the issue up. That way, there
is a developed body of lower court decisions and scholarly analysis for
the Court to consider. Thus, in Supreme Court litigation, it is often
better to be a later case to present an issue, not the first. That way, the
Court can consider the question presented after an appropriate study
by bench, academy, and bar. Williamson County, however, flipped that
usual script: the Court adopted the state-litigation requirement on its
own.59 Only after the Court imposed the rule did the bar and the
academy start to debate whether requiring a property owner to exhaust
state law procedures to ripen a federal takings claim was consistent
with the Fifth Amendment or was otherwise justifiable. Moreover, we
spent the next 30-plus years doing so. Ironically, only in Knick did the
Court finally get a full briefing on the issue.

56. Kruse v. Village of Chagrin Falls, 74 F.3d 694, 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Oxford U. Press ed. 1989)).
57. See Berger, supra note 47, at 102 (Williamson County transformed “the
ripeness doctrine from a minor anomaly into a procedural monster”).
58. See Brief for the United States, supra note 25.
59. See id.
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II. KNICK REOPENED THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS

This Part summarizes the Knick majority and dissenting opinions,
and focuses on their critical — but unstated — assumptions about the
nature of local government, and their relationship to state courts and
state inverse condemnation claims.
A. Rose Mary Knick: Ghostbuster

The Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, apparently has a problem with
unregulated cemeteries. So, it did what local governments do when
they think they have a problem — it passed a law. That law, Ordinance
12-12-20-001, required owners of all cemeteries, public or private, to
maintain them.60 The ordinance also contained two troublesome
provisions. First, it required the owners of the cemeteries to keep them
open to the public during the day.61 Second, it allowed the Township’s
code inspectors to enter “any property” to inspect and determine
whether it complies with the ordinance.62 Under the authority of the
ordinance, a code inspector came on Rose Mary Knick’s property
without a warrant and informed her that the Township believed that
an open field on her land was home to an old cemetery.63 She
disagreed. The inspector wrote her up for violating the ordinance.64
In Knick v. Township of Scott, Knick sued in Pennsylvania state
court, seeking to enjoin the enforcement action.65 In response, the
Township withdrew the notice of violation, and the parties agreed to
stay enforcement actions.66 But Knick did not include an inverse
condemnation claim or any other claim for compensation in her state
court challenge.67 After the Township issued a second notice of
violation of the ordinance and the state court denied Knick’s request
for a contempt order, she sued in federal court, asserting a violation of
her Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless searches, and her
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and just
compensation.68 After some back-and-forth on the contents of the

60. Scott Township, Pa., Ordinance 12-12-20-001 § 5 (Dec. 20, 2012); see also Knick
v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019).
61. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2168–69; Knick v. Township of Scott, 2016 WL 4701549, at *1–2 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 7, 2016).
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pleadings, the federal district court dismissed the action because Knick
had not exhausted her state law remedies under Williamson County’s
state procedures requirement.69
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.70 The
court concluded that Knick lacked Article III standing to assert a facial
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claim because she did not
appeal the district court’s ruling that the ordinance, as applied to her,
was lawful because the search was of an open field, and thus not
protected.71 She thus “accepted the District Court’s conclusion that
her Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.”72 Therefore, even
if she was injured by the inspector’s actions, her Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated. Even if a court were to enjoin the Township
from unconstitutionally enforcing the ordinance, it could still search an
open field (with or without the ordinance). Although the opinion
“recognize[d] that the Ordinance’s inspection provision ‘is
constitutionally suspect and we encourage the [Township] to abandon
it (or, at least, to modify it substantially),’” the court held that it needed
a plaintiff with standing in order to consider the argument.73
Ms. Knick fared no better with her claim for just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment. The court concluded she had not sought
compensation via available Pennsylvania law avenues and rejected
each of her three arguments that she did not need to pursue just
compensation in Pennsylvania courts. First, the court concluded that a
facial takings claim is not exempt from the state-procedures prong of
Williamson County.74 Second, the court rejected Knick’s argument
that her earlier state court lawsuit was enough to comply with the
requirement to pursue compensation in state court.75 That case,
however, was not a claim for just compensation, only for injunctive
relief, so the court held the state had not yet denied her
compensation.76 Finally, the court applied Williamson County and
held the federal takings claim was not ripe because Knick had not
sought and been denied compensation in Pennsylvania’s courts.77 Yes,
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 2169.
Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2017).

Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323. The Third Circuit had already held otherwise in County Concrete
Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2006), and “[w]e cannot overrule our
own precedent.” Knick, 862 F.3d at 323.
75. Id. at 323–24.
76. Id. at 326.
77. Id.
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it is an optional (“prudential”) doctrine the court recognized, but the
facts here did not suggest that it would be unfair to require Ms. Knick
to go back to state court and try and obtain compensation.78 The Third
Circuit distinguished decisions from other circuits which declined to
apply Williamson County, concluding that “there is ‘value in forcing a
second trip’ to state court here.”79 The Supreme Court agreed to
consider the case, which expressly asked the Court to revisit and
overrule Williamson County’s state litigation requirement.80
B. The Knick Majority: “That’s Some Catch, That Catch-22”81

The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions issued by a
sharply divided Supreme Court employed a plethora of very evocative
language: “aborning,”82 “[c]atch-22,”83 “loot,”84 “shaky,”85 “this ‘sue
me’ approach to the Takings Clause,”86 “overthrows,”87 “ a mountain
of precedent,”88 “smashes a hundred-plus years of legal rulings to
smithereens,”89 “first crack,”90 and “points for creativity.”91
Ultimately, the most important word from the case was “overruled,”
because the Court did just that: it expressly eliminated the state
procedures ripeness requirement.92 Not cut back, not worked around,
not questioned. Overruled. It is enough that the regulation takes
property, and the government has not already paid the owner
compensation, and property owners have no obligation to ripen a
federal takings claims by suing the local government for compensation
in a state court. The federal courthouse doors are open once again to

78. Id. at 328.
79. Id.
80. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162
(2019) (No. 17-647) (“Whether the Court should reconsider the portion of Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–96
(1985), requiring property owners to exhaust state court remedies to ripen federal
takings claims, as suggested by Justices of this Court?”).
81. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH–22 57 (6th ed. 1976).
82. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2172.
85. Id. at 2178.
86. Id. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 2183 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2184 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2185.
92. Id. at 2179 (“The state-litigation requirement of Williamson County is
overruled.”).
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property owners seeking to vindicate their federal constitutional claims
for compensation for municipal government overregulation of their
property.93
The majority opinion began by laying out the one-two punch of
Williamson County and San Remo: “The takings plaintiff thus finds
himself in a Catch-22: He cannot go to federal court without going to
state court first; but if he goes to state court and loses, his claim will be
barred in federal court. The federal claim dies aborning.”94
Then, importantly, the Court defined when a takings claim ripens,
and in doing so, defined what a “taking” looks like: “We now conclude
that the state-litigation requirement imposes an unjustifiable burden
on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our takings
jurisprudence, and must be overruled. A property owner has an
actionable Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes
his property without paying for it.”95
To be sure, the Court expressly overruling the state-litigation
ripeness requirement is important. But, the more critical part of this
statement is “conflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence,”
because it signals that Knick reveals more about substantive takings
doctrine than it does about the intricacies of federal procedure.96 By
defining the takings cause of action as ripe when the regulation applies
to the property and compensation has not been provided, the Court
emphasized that timing is everything.
The majority also summarized the biggest analytical hurdle,
Williamson County’s rationale which was purportedly based on the
text of the Fifth Amendment (“nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation”), and acknowledged that the
Fifth Amendment does not require payment contemporaneous with
the taking as long as there are procedures in place for the owner “to
obtain compensation after the fact.”97 The majority highlighted a
distinction that it would delve into later in the opinion — the difference
between equitable remedies for takings, and compensation — and
concluded that a federal court Section 1983 claim is ripe and may be

93. See id.
94. Id. at 2167. Even if the plaintiff wins in state court, he has no federal claim,
because by awarding compensation, the state court has, in effect, mooted the federal
“without just compensation” problem.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2168.
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filed immediately upon the constitutional violation — “when the
government takes his property without just compensation[.]”98
The majority opinion emphasized two main themes. First, property
rights should be treated the same as other rights in the Bill of Rights,
often more honored in the breach than the observance.99 Property, as
James Ely has reminded, was viewed by the original founders and the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment as the “guardian of every other
right,” and thus should be considered with the same scrutiny as other
rights by the courts.100
The second theme employed by the majority was a focus on the text
of the Fifth Amendment as the key to understanding the substance of
a regulatory takings claim, which is also the key to when such a claim
is ripe.101 Of course, the issue before the Court might have been
answered very simply: a municipality has taken property “without
compensation” when it applies a regulation to property, and the
regulation itself does not acknowledge the obligation to provide
compensation. The government claims it is merely regulating — not
taking — and, therefore, it does not believe that it is obligated to
provide compensation. That notion seems to be built into the concept
of regulatory takings where it is the exercise of some power other than
eminent domain, which is claimed by the property owner to have taken
property. Instead, the Knick majority responded directly to the core
logic of Williamson County by focusing instead on a more difficult
question:
The Clause provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.” It does not say: “Nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without an available procedure that
will result in compensation.” If a local government takes private
property without paying for it, the government has violated the Fifth
Amendment — just as the Takings Clause says — without regard to
subsequent state court proceedings.102

98. Id.
99. See id. at 2169 (“The state-litigation requirement relegates the Takings Clause
‘to the status of poor relation’ among the provisions of the Bill of Rights.” (quoting
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994))); see also United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993) (“Individual freedom finds tangible
expression in property rights.”).
100. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008).
101. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The United States, by
contrast, urges us not to enforce the Takings Clause as written.”).
102. Id. at 2170.
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Interestingly, the majority noted that it does not matter for purposes
of defining the constitutional violation, whether it is eminent domain
or some other governmental power being exercised, and “[t]he form of
the remedy d[oes] not qualify the right.”103 Having recognized that the
Constitution itself mandates when a taking occurs, the majority used
this line of thought to attack Williamson County’s rationale.104 The
obligation to pay compensation when property is taken is “selfexecuting,” and “automatically arises at the time the government takes
property without paying for it.”105 Thus, post-violation compensation
is a remedy, not an element of a claim. The Court also recognized the
distinction between “without just compensation” as an element of a
takings claim (Williamson County’s core textual rationale), and just
compensation as the most frequently-sought remedy for a regulatory
taking: “A later payment of compensation may remedy the
constitutional violation that occurred at the time of the taking, but that
does not mean the violation never took place. The violation is the only
reason compensation was owed in the first place.”106
As the majority opinion memorably put it, “[a] bank robber might
give the loot back, but he still robbed the bank.”107 Thus, the right to
compensation “arises at the time of the taking, regardless of posttaking remedies that may be available to the property owner.”108 The
Court relied on the case which requires that interest owed on a
compensation award runs from the time of the taking, and includes
both takings situations: affirmative exercises of the condemnation
power, and inverse condemnations.109 Section 1983 recognizes a cause
of action for a “deprivation” of a right “secured by the Constitution,”
and a “property owner may sue the government at that time in federal
court,” because that is when the deprivation of Fifth Amendment
rights occurs.110

103. Id. (“Jacobs made clear that, no matter what sort of procedures the government
puts in place to remedy a taking, a property owner has the Fifth Amendment
entitlement to compensation as soon as the government takes his property without
paying for it.” (emphasis added) (citing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933))).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2171.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2172.
108. Id.
109. See Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16–17. Of course, this is not technically “interest” at all,
but, more accurately, just compensation in the form of the time value of money.
However, everyone refers to it as interest, so this Article will as well.
110. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)).
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The majority next addressed the biggest conceptual hurdle that Ms.
Knick had to overcome: the idea that the Takings Clause “does not
provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance
of the occupancy of the land to be taken.”111 One might say that a large
part of current eminent domain practice is built on the notion, first
expressed in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., that
takings are valid even if the condemner does not immediately provide
just compensation, but only if the owner has a vested right to obtain it
in the future, including compensation for the delay in payment.112
Governments can, and often do, acquire or take property in multiple
ways, including “quick-take,” and in many of these situations, the
compensation is paid post-taking.113 As the courts have phrased it,
there must be a “reasonable, certain, and adequate” means to obtain
compensation for a taking to be valid.114 The Knick Court was keenly
aware that any ruling would need to avoid radically upsetting these
existing processes.115 The majority distinguished Cherokee Nation by
focusing on the remedy sought in that case: an injunction to stop the
taking (not compensation): “Simply because the property owner was
not entitled to injunctive relief at the time of the taking does not mean
there was no violation of the Takings Clause at that time.”116
The majority also distinguished Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., a case
in which the Court held that a property owner asserting a Fifth
Amendment takings claim against the federal government must seek
compensation under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims.117
Until she does so, the owner “has no claim against the Government”
for a taking.118 The majority concluded that the case must be read
narrowly because the remedy the plaintiff sought was to enjoin the
allegedly offending regulation.119 Applying the maxim that law comes
before equity, the Court noted that Ruckelshaus only should be read
to preclude equitable relief (injunction) when there is a legal remedy
(compensation), not that an owner has no takings claim until after a

111. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2175.
112. 135 U.S. 641, 659–61 (1890).
113. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1984).
114. Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659.
115. See Kirby, 467 U.S. at 3–5 (detailing at least three different ways in which the
federal government affirmatively takes property and provides compensation).
116. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2175.
117. 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984).
118. Id. at 1018 n.21.
119. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177–78.
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Tucker Act claim is rejected.120 In short, according to the majority,
there was a huge difference between trying to stop an exercise of the
eminent domain power or application of a regulation because
compensation has not already been provided, and a claim to recover
compensation once the property has been taken (either affirmatively
or by regulation).
Finally, the Court noted the practicalities. The Williamson
County/San Remo combination was “unworkable in practice,”121 and
the sky will not fall because of the new Knick rule, as it merely opens
the door to an alternative tribunal:
Our holding that uncompensated takings violate the Fifth
Amendment will not expose governments to new liability; it will
simply allow into federal court takings claims that otherwise would
have been brought as inverse condemnation suits in state court.
Governments need not fear that our holding will lead federal courts
to invalidate their regulations as unconstitutional. As long as just
compensation remedies are available — as they have been for nearly
150 years — injunctive relief will be foreclosed. For the same reason,
the Federal Government need not worry that courts will set aside
agency actions as unconstitutional under the Administrative
Procedures Act. Federal courts will not invalidate an otherwise
lawful uncompensated taking when the property owner can receive
complete relief through a Fifth Amendment claim brought under the
Tucker Act.122

Justice Thomas issued a short concurring opinion, also noting that
he “join[ed] in full” the majority:
This “sue me” approach to the Takings Clause is untenable. The Fifth
Amendment does not merely provide a damages remedy to a
property owner willing to “shoulder the burden of securing
compensation” after the government takes property without paying
for it. Instead, it makes just compensation a “prerequisite” to the
government’s authority to “tak[e] property for public use.” A

120. Id. at 2173 (“Equitable relief was not available because monetary relief was
under the Tucker Act.”).
121. Id. at 2178.
122. Id. at 2179 (citation omitted). In Knick, the remedy sought was just
compensation — money. And the defendant was a local municipal government. Thus,
it was an easy question whether the case could proceed in federal court. That leaves
unresolved the question: What about when the remedy sought is not compensation,
and the defendant who is alleged to have affected the taking is a state official — not a
municipality? When state officials who are alleged to have taken property without
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments assert immunity
to damage remedies under the Eleventh Amendment, the remedies available to a
property owner for the taking should include declaratory and injunctive relief.

2020] SUBLIMATING MUNICIPAL HOME RULE

531

“purported exercise of the eminent-domain power” is therefore
“invalid” unless the government “pays just compensation before or at
the time of its taking.”123

With Williamson County’s state procedures ripeness requirement
now gone — if only by a one-justice margin — what does this mean for
takings law?
First, Williamson County itself is not overruled, and the “final
decision” requirement, which was not challenged in Knick, is still
operative.124 Thus, in most cases, property owners still need to obtain
a final decision from the local government or agency about what uses,
if any, may be made of their property under the allegedly restrictive
regulation.125 A court will still need to know the remaining uses under
the allegedly offending regulation before it can determine whether the
economic impact on the owner of the regulation is so great that it goes
“too far” and amounts to a taking.126
Second, the San Remo preclusion trap is gone. The overruling of
the state-litigation requirement also implicitly overruled the
“preclusion trap” Catch-22 from that case.127 A property owner may
choose to litigate her state law takings or inverse claims in state
court.128 If she does so, she will likely be barred from later raising a
federal takings claim. However, she will no longer be forced to go to

123. Id. at 2179 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v.
Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016)). I think Justice Thomas wrote separately for several
reasons. First, Justice Thomas emphasized that the Constitution’s requirements are the
requirements, and that we have always done it this way, and arguments based on the
idea that “this might cost too much” are not going to fly with him: “if this requirement
makes some regulatory programs ‘unworkable in practice,’ then so be it — our role is
to enforce the Takings Clause as written.” Id. (citation omitted). Strong stuff. Second,
Justice Thomas apparently does not care for nationwide injunctions, and Knick’s focus
on the compensation remedy over injunctive relief gave him a chance to ring that bell.
Finally, Justice Thomas noted that the Court’s recognition of a federal takings claim
that may be raised in federal court does not preclude other similar claims from being
pursued, including “common-law tort claims, such as trespass.”
124. See id. at 2169 (“Knick does not question the validity of this finality
requirement, which is not at issue here.”).
125. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 186–87 (1985); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981).
126. See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 190–91 (holding the economic impact of
regulation “simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at
a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the
particular land in question”).
127. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167 (the majority noted, “[t]he San Remo preclusion
trap should tip us off that the state-litigation requirement rests on a mistaken view of
the Fifth Amendment.”).
128. See id.
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state court in the first instance and raise a state law inverse
condemnation claim, only to be later told she thereby litigated the
federal takings claim by implication. Property owners again have the
choice of a state or federal forum, as plaintiffs asserting their
constitutional rights have in every other situation.129 As do municipal
and state defendants, at least in part, because they may still remove a
takings lawsuit filed in state court to federal court if the suit includes a
federal takings claim. But the shenanigans which surrounded the
International College remove-and-dismiss game, as well as the
doctrinal imbalance of letting defendants choose a federal forum while
denying plaintiffs that same choice, are over.
Third, Knick reemphasized the usual remedy for regulatory takings
claims: show me the money.130 The usual cause of action in cases
against municipal and local government defendants is under the Civil
Rights Act and Section 1983, seeking compensation. Property owners
are not going to get the federal courts to enjoin an uncompensated
regulatory taking or declare a statute or regulation unconstitutional for
violating the Takings Clause unless, for some reason, no compensation
is available.131 For example, what if the defendant is a state, and
recovering compensation is barred in federal court by the Eleventh
Amendment? If you are prohibited from your legal remedy of
compensation, may you ask for an injunction under Ex parte Young?132
Fourth, with the “too early” ripeness requirement now somewhat
defanged, look for a revival of “too late” arguments such as statutes of
limitations. One court has already picked up the mantle, asserting that
Knick’s holding about when a taking occurs means that the statute of
limitations clock starts ticking from the moment a regulation applies to
a property owner, even if the owner did not realize that it had.133

129. Leone v. County of Maui, 404 P.3d 1257 (Haw. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
917 (2019), is a good example of why federal court jurisdiction for federal takings
claims is important. There, because of Williamson County, a wealthy property owner
was forced to ask a county jury to decide whether he was entitled to compensation for
the county’s deprivation of a very expensive beachfront property of all uses. The local
jury, unsurprisingly, said no. Would the outcome have been different had the jury been
selected from the federal district’s pool, and not merely the from the defendant’s
locale? Unknown, of course. But the property owner would have at least liked to have
that choice.
130. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172.
131. Id. at 2168.
132. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Also, under Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 569 U.S.
513 (2013), a property owner may raise a takings defense to the imposition of a
regulation or statute, on the grounds that subjecting the owner to the statute’s
requirements would result in an uncompensated taking.
133. See Campbell v. United States, 932 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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Finally, the Knick majority took great care to preserve the existing
system of regulatory or inverse claims against the federal government,
where property owners seek compensation for relatively small takings
in district courts, and for major compensation, in the Article I Court of
Federal Claims.134
As a result of Knick, the federal judiciary’s unnecessary thirty-year
abandonment of property and takings cases involving municipal and
local governments is at long last over. The Court rightly relegated to
history’s dustbin a judicially created doctrine that deprived property
owners of a federal court forum to resolve federal constitutional claims.
The decades of damage that Williamson County’s state procedures
requirement wrought on property owners cannot be retroactively
undone, of course. However, by putting property rights back on equal
footing with other constitutional rights, Knick was a big step in the right
direction. The Court rectified an unforced error — a mistake it never
should have made — and correctly restored property owners’ rights to
the “full-fledged constitutional status” they should enjoy.135
C. The Knick Dissent: Chicken Little and Let Sleeping Dogs Lie

During the first round of oral arguments, Justice Breyer asked
whether, even if Williamson County was a bad rule, the Court should
“let sleeping dogs lie?”
JUSTICE BREYER: You don’t have to — the problem — the
problem — I mean, you could say what Justice Gorsuch said, couldn’t
you? The state says: No, we’re not going to pay you. Ha, because
there’s no compensation — there’s no taking. Ha.

In the case of a regulatory taking, however, the taking may occur before the
effect of the regulatory action is felt and actual damage to the property
interest is entirely determinable. As the Supreme Court recently stated in a
regulatory takings case, “a property owner has a claim for a violation of the
Takings Clause as soon as [the] government takes his property for public use
without paying for it” without regard to post-taking remedies that may be
available. In other words, “because a taking without compensation violates
the self-executing Fifth Amendment at the time of the taking, the property
owner can bring a federal suit at that time.”
Id. (quoting Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170).
134. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179.
135. See id. at 2170, 2174 (noting that Williamson County could have been decided
on the basis that the property owner had not obtained a final decision from the agency,
and it was unnecessary for the Court to adopt the state procedures requirement).
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And we could say that’s a final decision not to take it. We could. I
mean, I don’t see any logic. But Williamson didn’t. So I thought:
Well, why let the sleeping dog — let it lie?136

The idea that repose is more important than getting it right turned
out to be a key point of departure for the four dissenters, who revealed
several fundamental disconnects with the majority about takings
law.137 Interestingly, the dissenters did not merely hold their figurative
noses to let the state procedures dog lie because it had been around for
thirty-plus years, but instead doubled down on its rationale. Justice
Kagan’s dissent was the full-throated explication of Williamson County
that the Court in Williamson County itself never made: the state
procedures rationale was not merely long-standing law, it was
correct.138
The first fundamental disconnect with the majority about takings
law was that the dissenters rejected the majority’s view that property
rights should be treated the same as other rights recognized under the
Bill of Rights. Instead, they viewed the Takings Clause as “unique
among the Bill of Rights’ guarantees.”139 To the dissenters, this is a
textual argument (harking back to Williamson County) because, in
their view, there is no constitutional violation unless and until “the
government” denies compensation.140 The dissent focuses on the longstanding rules which do not require payment of compensation before
or at the time of an affirmative taking by eminent domain.141 Cherokee
Nation rejected the notion that the Fifth Amendment requires advance
payment, as long as “reasonable, certain, and adequate” post-taking
compensation is available.142 To the dissenters, a state law inverse
condemnation action in state court qualifies as a vested promise to pay,
if there has been a taking.143 Williamson County merely reflected how
the Takings Clause works in regulatory takings cases: the same way it
works in eminent domain (according to the dissent). Thus, the logic
goes, a state court inverse claim to recover compensation for the legal
taking is a prerequisite to a ripe federal cause of action. This, the

136. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44–45, Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 17-647).
137. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2186–87 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So when the government ‘takes and pays,’ it is not
violating the Constitution at all.”).
141. See id. at 2181–86 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
142. See Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890) (“[T]he owner
is entitled to reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining . . . the
compensation to which, under the constitution, he is entitled[.]”).
143. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2185 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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dissent asserted, is based on “a hundred years” worth of “precedent
after precedent,”144 “stretching back to the late 1800s.”145 After all, the
dissenters argued, no one is claiming that federal quick-takes are
unconstitutional.146 There, property is seized before the adjudication
and payment of compensation. Is there not a critical difference
between an eminent domain quick-take where the government
occupies now, with the corresponding recognition of the absolute
obligation of the government to pay whatever the court later
determines is just compensation, and a regulatory taking where the
government is exercising some other power, and absolutely denies that
it needs to pay anything? “Reasonable, certain, and adequate”
presumes that the government admits it owes compensation, not
where, as in inverse and regulatory cases, it asserts it was merely
regulating, and thus owes nothing for exercising that power.
The second fundamental split between the majority and the dissent
was on the practical consequences of the decision. In contrast to the
majority, which focused on the impacts the state procedures
requirement has had on property owners, the dissent focused instead
on regulators: “The majority’s overruling of Williamson County will
have two damaging consequences. It will inevitably turn even wellmeaning government officials into lawbreakers. And it will subvert
important principles of judicial federalism. To begin with, today’s
decision means that government regulators will often have no way to
avoid violating the Constitution.”147
As Justice Gorsuch recently wrote in another case, “Really?”148
Government regulators are in no worse off position after Knick on the
merits of takings questions than they were before, and are no more
“lawbreakers” today than in the past thirty years.149 The only major
difference is that as a consequence of Knick, they may now have to
answer to a federal judge and not a state judge, and cannot employ
Williamson County’s state procedures requirement. The bar that
property owners must cross in order to prove a regulation actually

144. Id. at 2185 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 2180 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2182 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
148. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1999 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
149. For more thoughts on this, see Ilya Somin, Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending
a Catch-22 that Barred Takings Case from Federal Court, 2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 153, 185 (2019).
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takes property and requires compensation remains extremely high.150
This objection was more like chicken nothing than chicken little.151
D. Stare Decisis and Reverse Percolation

Perhaps the dissent’s most significant criticism of the majority was
on the question of the sleeping dog and stare decisis.152 In the last
section of her dissent, Justice Kagan vigorously argued the Court
should not overturn Williamson County for all the reasons that a court
of last resort should not lightly overturn precedent. This appeared to
be aimed at a much broader audience than the majority justices,
property owners, their lawyers, and takings scholars because the stare
decisis debate is part of a much larger context, framed by other cases.
Whether it is prudent to go back and revisit existing case decisions and
rules of law generally is a question this Article shall leave to other
commentators. Despite concerns about overturning recent decisions,
Williamson County was a uniquely bad stare decisis hill to die on, for
two main reasons.
First, the state-litigation rule which Williamson County adopted sua
sponte was the usual “percolation” process in reverse.153 The Solicitor
General raised the issue (not the parties),154 and the Court simply
accepted and adopted it without the benefit of party briefing or prior
deep consideration by the legal academy.155 Consequently, the
rationale which the Court adopted in Williamson County was too

150. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
151. In Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012),
a unanimous Court rejected a similar argument that holding in favor of the property
owner on compensation would undermine the federal government’s ability to control
flooding. See id. at 37 (“We have rejected this argument when deployed to urge blanket
exemptions from the Fifth Amendment’s instruction. While we recognize the
importance of the public interests the Government advances in this case, we do not see
them as categorically different from the interests at stake in myriad other Takings
Clause cases. The sky did not fall after [United States v.] Causby [, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)],
and today’s modest decision augurs no deluge of takings liability.”); see also Somin,
supra note 149, at 185 (“However, it is far from clear that Knick presages a major
revolution in favor of stronger protection for constitutional property rights under the
Takings Clause.”).
152. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Everything said above
aside, Williamson County should stay on the books because of stare decisis.”).
153. See id. at 2174.
154. See id.
155. The majority responded to the dissent’s outrage that by overruling Williamson
County, the majority was creating a stare decisis crisis. Noting the avalanche of
criticisms from all sides of the spectrum, the majority pointed out the doctrine’s “shaky
foundations” and slow erosion from a seemingly mandatory jurisdictional rule to an
optional prudential one. Id. at 2178.
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clever by half, and a self-inflicted wound. Nor was the validity and
application of the doctrine ever tested or argued directly in the Court
in the intervening decades, with a small exception of 2005’s San Remo
v. City and County of San Francisco.156 However, even in that case, the
arguments were more focused on preclusion and full faith and credit,
and why Williamson County did not control, not why it was
fundamentally wrong.157 The petitioner avoided expressly asking to
overrule Williamson County.158
That leads to the second reason that Williamson County should rank
low in the hierarchy of stare decisis precedents. The last 30-plus years
of experience starkly revealed that the theory did not work in practice.
What value was there in retaining a procedure that led to such
overwhelming real-world problems? Even the rule’s supporters, as the
majority pointed out, did not strenuously defend it for the reasons it
was adopted.159 In Knick, the Township did not vigorously defend
Williamson County under the same analysis by which the Court
originally adopted the rule. Instead, it couched its arguments mainly
in terms of federal jurisdiction and Section 1983.160 This was not
exactly a resounding endorsement of Williamson County’s rationale.
Thus, the dissent’s objections on stare decisis grounds are really more
of a howl of protest about the doctrine in other cases, not this one,
which did not deserve deference simply by the passage of time.
III. DISCOVERING KNICK’S HOME RULE RATIONALE

Part III argues that the Knick opinions are best understood in light
of the unstated assumptions that each held about the nature of the
relationship between municipal governments and state courts. This
Part further suggests that Knick was based on a separation of powers
between local governments and state judiciaries.
The most fundamental disconnect between the Knick majority and
the dissent was, interestingly, not expressly set out in either opinion.
Yet it underlies the competing rationales. The core of this sublimated
dispute was whether a state law inverse condemnation claim, resolved

156. 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
157. Id. at 337–38.
158. See generally id. The lesson from the San Remo arguments was not lost on
property owners and their counsel. By the time Ms. Knick filed her petition, several
had already asked the Court directly to overturn Williamson County. See, e.g.,
Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016).
159. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2174–75.
160. See Brief for Respondents at 28–34, Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 17-647) (“A
plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution.”).
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by a state court, was part-and-parcel of a local government’s taking and
compensation process.161 Put another way, is the availability of a state
court lawsuit the functional equivalent of a local government’s promise
to pay for a taking?
The majority concluded no: “A property owner has an actionable
Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes his
property without paying for it.”162 The majority assumed that when a
municipal government is doing the taking, state law making a state
court inverse condemnation lawsuit available was not “the [same]
government” doing the compensating. Thus, to the majority, the
availability of after-the-taking compensation in state court by way of a
state law inverse condemnation claim was completely irrelevant to the
question of whether the taking was accomplished “without just
compensation” by the local government.163
The dissent, by contrast, had a completely different view on the
matter. Although the dissenters reached the opposite conclusion on
that question, Justice Kagan’s opinion at least regarded the inquiry
similarly: whether “the government” promises to pay compensation
when state law makes available a state court inverse condemnation
claim.
Begin with the basics — the meaning of the Takings Clause. The right
that the Clause confers is not to be free from government takings of
property for public purposes. Instead, the right is to be free from
those takings when the government fails to provide ‘just
compensation.’ In other words, the government can take private
property for public purposes, so long as it fairly pays the property
owner.164

The dissenters viewed state courts as part-and-parcel of the local
government’s compensation mechanism, not truly separate branches of
state governments.165 The answer was obvious, and nothing more than
what follows from a reading of the Takings Clause “as night the day.”166
So obvious that the dissent did not address its assumption that local
governments and state courts are, collectively, “the government,”
161. See, e.g., Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that state
court inverse condemnation claim is the equivalent of a Tucker Act claim for
compensation).
162. Id. at 2167 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 2177.
164. Id. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphases added and in original).
165. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Put another way, a Takings Clause violation has
two necessary elements. First, the government must take the property. Second, it must
deny the property owner compensation.” (emphasis added)).
166. Id. at 2182 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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except with an unsupported assertion that “[t]he Tucker Act is the
Federal Government’s equivalent of a State’s inverse condemnation
procedure, by which a property owner can obtain just
compensation.”167
However, when state courts adjudicate a state law inverse
condemnation claim, they are not acting as an arm of local government.
Instead, state courts are simply doing what courts do: resolving a
controversy.168 The dissent’s assumption that state courts are tasked
with authority to provide compensation when local governments take
property is based on an outmoded view of local governments as legally
indistinguishable from the state because local governments are mere
administrative conveniences and do not possess any distinct or
independent authority.169 This is the storied “Dillon Rule.” However,
this is a decidedly minority view today, and the overwhelming
approach to a state’s relationship with its political subdivisions can be
characterized as either the “Cooley rule,”170 or “home rule.”171 Under

167. Id. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
168. See Brian P. Keenan, Note, Subdivisions, Standing and the Supremacy Clause:
Can a Political Subdivision Sue Its Parent State Under Federal Law?, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1899, 1900 (2005) (“[Local governments] offer a miniature version of federalism
on the state level, dividing the power of the state and placing many important decisions
in the hands of representatives closer to the people.”).
169. See City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475
(1868) (Dillon, C.J.); 1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55,
at 174 (2d ed. 1873); see also City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923)
(“The power of the state, unrestrained by the contract clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment, over the rights and property of cities held and used for ‘governmental
purposes’ cannot be questioned.”); Josh Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A
New Approach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 390 (2012) (noting that
“[m]unicipalities were held to be creatures of the state, having no rights beyond those
given to them by the state that created them”) (citing Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161 (1907)).
170. In People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 108 (1871) (Cooley, J.,
concurring), Justice Thomas Cooley, responding to the Dillon Rule, wrote:
The state may mould [sic] local institutions according to its views of policy or
expediency; but local government is matter of absolute right; and the state
cannot take it away. It would be the boldest mockery to speak of a city as
possessing municipal liberty where the state not only shaped its government,
but at discretion sent in its own agents to administer it; or to call that system
one of constitutional freedom under which it should be equally admissible to
allow the people full control in their local affairs, or no control at all.

Id.

171. JEFFERSON FORDHAM, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL
HOME RULE (1953). Forty-eight states have “home rule” legislation or constitutional
provisions. Jarit C. Polley, Uncertainty for the Energy Industry: A Fractured Look at
Home Rule, 34 ENERGY L.J. 261, 268 (2013) (citing RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE
REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 268 (6th ed. 2004)).
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this approach, in areas of local interest, municipalities have the power
to act without the state’s approval, and in some instances, a locality’s
law may be superior to conflicting state law.172 Even though the
Supreme Court endorsed the Dillon Rule in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh,173 the Court subsequently recognized that states’ usual
broad powers over political subdivisions are limited when important
federal constitutional rights are at issue.174 Thus, even in a Dillon Rule
jurisdiction, the federal interest in ensuring just compensation for
actions which effect a taking should count more than a state’s interest
in exercising detailed control over its political subdivisions. This is the
more enlightened view of the place of municipalities within the federalstate-local government vertical separation of governmental powers and
responsibilities.175 The Knick majority’s implicit recognition of the
separation between local governments and state judiciaries should be
considered an affirmation of the modern view of state-municipal
relations.176

172. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“Each political subdivision shall have the
power to frame and adopt a charter for its own self-government within such limits and
under such procedures as may be provided by general law. Such procedures, however,
shall not require the approval of a charter by a legislative body. Charter provisions with
respect to a political subdivision’s executive, legislative and administrative structure
and organization shall be superior to statutory provisions, subject to the authority of
the legislature to enact general laws allocating and reallocating powers and
functions.”).
173. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
174. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696
(1994) (federal interest in avoiding the establishment of religion); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (federal interest in race-neutral municipal
boundaries); Keenan, supra note 168, at 1902 n.15 (citing Grumet, 512 U.S. 687) (“The
state’s power over its political subdivisions is therefore not completely unlimited.”).
175. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 179–80; Shirk v. City of Lancaster, 169 A. 557, 560 (Pa.
1933); Michael A. Lawrence, Do “Creatures of the State” Have Constitutional

Rights?: Standing for Municipalities to Assert Procedural Due Process Claims Against
the State, 47 VILL. L. REV. 93, 94 n.6 (2002) (“In addition, other state and federal cases

bolster the proposition that states’ power over their municipal corporations is limited
in some respects by the Constitution.” (citing Atlanta Coast Demolition & Recycling,
Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 893 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.J. 1995))).
176. Two additional rules emphasize the difference between local governments and
states. First, unlike states, local governments and other creatures of state law are not
immune under the Eleventh Amendment from being sued in the federal courts without
their consent. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.”); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (the amendment is a form
of sovereign immunity). Second, local governments and municipal corporations are
“persons” under the statutory vehicle most often employed to raise federal
constitutional claims, the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996); Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658, 683 (1978) (“An examination of the debate on § 1
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Thus, when the dissent asserted, “[t]he Takings Clause is different
because it does not prohibit takings; to the contrary, it permits them
provided the government gives just compensation. So when the
government ‘takes and pays,’ it is not violating the Constitution at all,”
one can see how it conflates the municipal government defendant and
the state judiciary into “the government.”177 But in Knick, the
Township has not “taken and paid,” and the Township had not
provided an implied promise to pay if indeed it took property. Indeed,
the only reason a property owner needs to sue “the government” is that
“the government” has refused to pay. Rather, the local government
has taken, and the state judiciary may have eventually ordered it to
pay. One of the theories of federal separation of powers is premised
on the idea that every governmental action may be classified as
legislative, executive, or judicial.178 When a state court adjudicates a
state law taking or inverse condemnation claim, it is plainly acting in its
judicial capacity.
The following passage best reveals the dissent’s false assumption:
“The majority today holds, in conflict with precedent after precedent,
that a government violates the Constitution whenever it takes property
without advance compensation — no matter how good its commitment
to pay.”179
What “commitment to pay” has a local government made if all it
says to property owners who say that their property has been taken by
regulation is “sue me” in state court?180 None. The availability of a
state court action for inverse condemnation under state law is not any
kind of recognition by the local government that it may be liable for a
taking at all. It is simply an available avenue to adjudicate whether a
local government may be liable for a taking under state law. The Knick
majority’s unstated assumption is that state judges and state courts are
much like their federal counterparts — the deciders. Indeed, even
judges on the most “local” of courts view themselves as adjudicators,
separate from their local governments.181

[of the Civil Rights Act] and application of appropriate rules of construction show
unequivocally that § 1 was intended to cover legal, as well as natural, persons.”).
177. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
178. See David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California Constitutional Law:
Separation of Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 659 (2011) (citing Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1734–35 (1996)).
179. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
180. Hat tip to Justice Thomas. Id. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring).
181. See Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local Governments, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 707, 715–16 (2015) (“At the most local level, judges maintain a strong
sense of separation of powers, that tends to isolate local judges from other local
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Illustrating the distinction is the Knick dissent’s reliance on an
analogy to federal Tucker Act claims for compensation in the Court of
Federal Claims, and the majority opinion’s rejection of that analogy.
The dissenters asked why a state court inverse condemnation lawsuit
seeking compensation is not the very same thing as a Tucker Act claim
for compensation, a process the majority did not disturb:
Fourth and finally, the majority lays claim to another line of decisions
— involving the Tucker Act — but with no greater success. The
Tucker Act waives the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity
and grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits seeking
compensation for takings. According to the majority, this Court’s
cases establish that such an action “is a claim for a violation of the
Fifth Amendment” — that is, for a constitutional offense that has
already happened because of the absence of advance payment. But
again, the precedents say the opposite. The Tucker Act is the Federal

Government’s equivalent of a State’s inverse condemnation
procedure, by which a property owner can obtain just compensation.

The former, no less than the latter, forestalls any constitutional
violation by ensuring that an owner gets full and fair payment for a
taking.182

The majority opinion pointed to the same Tucker Act process, but
reached a completely different conclusion about its meaning:
We have long recognized that property owners may bring Fifth
Amendment claims against the Federal Government as soon as their
property has been taken. The Tucker Act, which provides the
standard procedure for bringing such claims, gives the Court of
Federal Claims jurisdiction to “render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution” or
any federal law or contract for damages “in cases not sounding in
tort.” We have held that “[i]f there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded
upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims to hear and determine.”183

Were the Court of Federal Claims an Article III court, the dissenters
might have had a better point in asserting that it is the same as state

officials in the legislature and the executive. At the less-than-local county level,
however, it seems that collaboration is more likely to occur as sister government
branches work together to effectuate policy.”) (footnote omitted); see also Paul J. De
Muniz, Oregon Courts Today and Tomorrow, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 291, 292 (2014)
(describing how the Oregon state court system evolved into a unified statewide system
“shifting fiscal responsibility for the judiciary away from the local governments and
placing it almost entirely with the state”).
182. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
183. Id. at 2170 (citations omitted).
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general jurisdiction courts. But the Court of Federal Claims is an
Article I legislative tribunal, different in kind than an Article III
court.184 Despite being labeled a “court,” and its members “judges,”
the Court of Federal Claims in substance serves much the same
function as Congress itself did in the days when claims for
compensation were submitted as special bills: to determine whether the
legislature must pay compensation.185 Thus, most critically for the
Knick analysis, by creating the Court of Federal Claims:
Congress did not create the Court of Federal Claims as an
independent “constitutional” court pursuant to Article III of the
constitution. Instead, Congress explicitly provided, when creating it,
that the new Court of Federal Claims is a “legislative court,” created
pursuant to Article I. The distinction is one with a profound
difference.186

The division of power between local governments, on the one hand,
and state courts, on the other, differs from both types of federal takings
— eminent domain takings, and regulatory takings or inverse
condemnations by the federal government — in two ways. First, in
federal eminent domain takings, the federal government has
acknowledged its obligation to pay compensation if it decides to
acquire the property at the adjudicated prices, and the owner’s right to
compensation vests when title transfers from owner to the federal

184. See Brott v. United States, 858 F.3d 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2017) (the Court of
Federal Claims, an Article I tribunal, has exclusive jurisdiction to consider takings
claims which seek in excess of $10,000 in compensation), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1324
(2018).
185. The judges of the Court of Federal Claims do not enjoy the same protections
afforded Article III judges. For example, they are appointed for 15-year terms, are
subject to removal by a majority of the members of the Federal Circuit, and their
salaries may be reduced. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 172, 176 (1992). Takings claimants in the
Court of Federal Claims are not entitled to have the case considered by a jury. 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (2011); see also Michael P. Goodman, Taking Back Takings Claims: Why

Congress Giving Just Compensation Jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims is
Unconstitutional, 60 VILL. L. REV. 101, 104 (2015) (“The Court of Federal Claims is

not entirely like the federal district courts, however . . . there are important differences
between the Court of Federal Claims and the federal district courts.”).
186. Goodman, supra note 185, at 86 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1992)). Whether
Congress’ assignment of major just compensation claims to an Article I tribunal
comports with the ideas that the right to compensation is “self-executing” and should
therefore not need a waiver of sovereign immunity, and that the calculation of
compensation is an “inherently judicial” function, see Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893), is beyond the scope of this Article. For our
purposes here, suffice it to note that challenges to the Court of Federal Claims’
exclusive jurisdiction over these claims have not met with a receptive audience. See,
e.g., Brott, 858 F.3d at 429, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1324 (2018); TrinCo Inv. Co. v.
United States, 140 Fed. Cl. 530 (2018).
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government. Second, in federal regulatory takings, the federal
government itself has created a legislative forum where property
owners who assert that an action by the government has affected a
taking may seek compensation. Thus, the role of the Court of Federal
Claims and state courts are dramatically different. In a federal taking,
the federal government is both doing the (alleged) taking, and, via the
Court of Federal claims, has offered up a “reasonable, certain, and
adequate” means for obtaining post-hoc compensation. Not so in
regulatory takings by local governments. In short, the more sensible
understanding is that once “the [municipal] government” (allegedly)
takes property, all the owner need do to ripen a claim is ask “the
government” (the same government) to pay up, and it does not need
to ask a separate branch of the state to force the municipality to do so.
CONCLUSION

In the nearly 100 years since Justice Holmes famously opined in
Mahon that if a regulation goes “too far” it will be recognized as a
taking without just compensation, the Court has made clear that a
regulation is a taking when it either forces an owner to surrender even
a small part of her right to exclude, or deprives the owner of
“productive use” of property. In Knick, we now have the first case in
the modern takings oeuvre in which the Court expresses clearly what
the second part of a cause of action — “without just compensation” —
looks like.
At long last, a majority of the Court appears to understand that a
federal takings claim against a local or municipal government is ripe
for adjudication if the government has not acknowledged its obligation
to provide compensation. Because the government’s obligation is
“self-executing,” the claim arises now and the owner may pursue a
federal compensation remedy now, either in state or federal court.
Pursuing and losing a state law inverse condemnation claim is not an
element of a federal takings claim.

